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Preface: 
Ten years after its most devastating attack, al-Qaeda has turned into a franchiser, publisher, 
and occasional climate-change activist. Can the world’s most deadly terrorist group go 
mainstream and keep its edge? 
As its enemies solemnly prepare to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the September 11 
attacks in the US, al-Qaeda faces an unusual predicament for a terrorist network: a brand 
crisis. The al-Qaeda name is being used by organisations from Yemen to Tunisia who 
embrace the group’s narrative of Muslim oppression at the hands of Western powers since 
the Crusades. Everyone in the wired world has access to Osama bin Laden’s message – but 
with user-generated content the al-Qaeda brand can be turned into anything anyone with a 
computer wants it to be. How much longer can an ideology claim to be extremist when it 
seems to offer something for everyone?  
As it begins its second decade after September 11, is it time for al-Qaeda to rebrand, or 
even reinvent itself as a mainstream party that can play directly to a new broader base? 
Like many successful brands, al-Qaeda has adapted to changing circumstances while 
staying true to its core. Even in a decade in which its operatives have failed to pull off 
another attack as spectacular as 9/11, the flops reinforced the brand. Blown plots, often by 
individuals born in western societies, have strengthened the idea of al-Qaeda as an 
omnipresent threat and fed its mystique of a heroic grassroots resistance against the West’s 
corrupted societies.  
For a group with a pre-modern ideology, al-Qaeda has adjusted nimbly to 21st-century 
opportunities. It has used online channels and built media agencies such as As-Sahab, 
redirecting its propaganda from threads in obscure chatrooms to YouTube and even a slick 
online magazine in English, Inspire. Through those media, al-Qaeda has looked beyond 
merely recruiting radical individuals to resonating with wider audiences. Talking about oil 
contracts in the aftermath of the Iraq War was designed to appeal to the anti-global 
movement. Following the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, bin Laden expressed 
environmental concerns.  
That strategy may be creating a lot of sympathisers but not many terrorists. The next natural 
step for bin Laden – establishing al-Qaeda as a mainstream political movement – doesn’t 
seem to be available to him. The group’s ultimate objective is the establishment of a 
caliphate based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. Few of the ordinary people who might 
sympathise with the group, for its anti-Americanism or emphasis on the West’s moral double 
standards, are ready to radically change their way of life. And there could not be a greater 
contradiction for al-Qaeda than turning into a political party, which would seem to embrace 
its opponents’ rhetoric about democracy. Al-Qaeda's brand can thrive only at the margins. 
Monocle comment: 
Al-Qaeda’s brand may face a potential crisis, but for liberal western countries the only 
strategy is to stay true to themselves. They might not be perfect but a vigorous debate over 
mistakes can reaffirm their greatest strengths. 
 
